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LEGALITY OF AGE RESTRICTIONS IN
THE NBA AND THE NFL
Michael A. McCannt
Joseph S. Rosent
This Essay examines age eligibility rules in the National Football
League (NFL) and the National Basketball Association (NBA), offers
analysis of related antitrust and labor law issues, and shares perspec-
tive on underlying policies. It primarily reflects a synthesis of our re-
marks during the Case Western Reserve School of Law's Symposium
on Sports and Eligibility, held on November 11, 2005. For purposes
of both clarity and illumination, we add additional commentary. We
also preserve our comments from the question and answer session, as
our individual viewpoints sometimes vary.
I. NFL AND NBA AGE ELIGIBILITY RULES
The NFL and the NBA are the only major sports organizations that
prohibit players from entrance until a prescribed period after high
school graduation. Major League Baseball, the National Hockey
League, NASCAR, professional tennis, professional golf, and profes-
sional boxing have no such rules. Individuals can also partake in pro-
fessional acting, theater, music, and other entertainment professions
without waiting an obligatory period after high school graduation.
The same is true of those who enlist in the U.S. armed forces and in
various occupations that require maturity and discipline. Such an em-
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ployment landscape raises inquiry as to why NFL and NBA teams,
unlike so many other employers, would agree to boycott any candi-
date, regardless of talent or skill, until a prescribed period after high
school graduation. This inquiry enjoys heightened interest when con-
sidering that NFL and NBA teams are incomparable employers, as
players may not play in other leagues for similar compensation. In
contemplating this inquiry, this Part first examines age eligibility in
the NFL and then in the NBA.
For an amateur football player to be eligible for the NFL draft, at
least three years must pass from when that player graduated high
school and the NFL draft (the "NFL age eligibility rule"). The NFL
age eligibility rule is premised on four core beliefs about all players
who fail to satisfy it: (1) they lack the requisite mental or physical
maturity to play in the NFL; (2) they are uniquely prone to injury; (3)
they would damage the league product and repel fans; and (4) if eligi-
ble for the NFL draft, they would be more likely to use steroids.1
These four beliefs were recently rejected outright by the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York.2 Nevertheless, they re-
main the presumptively validating rationales for the NFL age eligibil-
ity rule.3
Significantly, however, the NFL Commissioner may waive the
NFL age eligibility rule at his discretion. For instance, when Larry
Fitzgerald, Jr. of the University of Pittsburgh participated in the 2004
NFL draft after only two and one-half years had passed from the date
of his high school graduation.4 Fitzgerald's father, a well-known
sports journalist, would later credit the "relationship" he and his at-
torney had "built over the years with commissioner Paul Tagliabue"
as crucial in obtaining a waiver.5
Unlike age eligibility rules for other sports leagues that reflect ex-
plicit collective bargaining between management and players' asso-
ciations, the NFL age eligibility rule has traveled a murkier road to
fruition. Until the National Football League Management Council
(NFLMC) and the National Football League Players' Association
(NFLPA) revised their collective bargaining agreement in March
2006, previously collectively bargained language did not include this
rule.6 This omission contrasted with the extraordinary detail paid to a
1 Clarett, 306 F. Supp. at 408.
2 Id. at 408-09.
' Clarett, 369 F.3d 124 (reversing the District Court).
4 See Larry Fitzgerald, A Different View of the Draft, THE SPORTING NEWS, Apr. 19,
2004, at 10.
5 id.
6 See With CBA Finished, Tagliabue May Quit, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, at C4.
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myriad of other subjects of employment. In fact, the rule only ap-
peared empowered by a memorandum issued by the NFL Commis-
sioner in 1990 and, arguably, the NFL Bylaws.
7
Eligibility for the NBA draft, on the other hand, requires that an
amateur player of American origin be at least nineteen-years-old on
December 31 of the year of the NBA draft and that at least one NBA
season must have passed from when he graduated from high school,
or when he would have graduated from high school, and the NBA
draft (the "NBA age eligibility rule").8 The NBA age eligibility rule
represents a provision in the 2005 collective bargaining agreement
between the NBA and the National Basketball Players' Association
(NBPA). 9 It heightens a previous rule that had only required that a
player possess either a high school diploma or its equivalent.'0 Much
like the NFL age eligibility rule, the NBA age eligibility rule is prem-
ised on a mixture of paternalistic and economic considerations."
The new NBA age eligibility rule has generated widespread skep-
ticism and bewilderment, as NBA players who matriculated straight
from high school comprise a small, self-selected, and remarkably suc-
cessful group.1 2 The rule appears to promote the economic interests of
colleges and universities, as premiere high school seniors who would
otherwise jump to the NBA are now likely to play college basketball
for at least one season.13 The rule also furthers the NBA's de facto
minor-league system (i.e., Division I college basketball) in which
7 See infra p. 743.
8 See NBPA, Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. X, § 1 (2005), available at
http://www.nbpa.com/cbaarticles/article-X.php#sectionl. International players, who are de-
fined as those living outside the U.S. for at least the preceding three years and who neither com-
pleted high school nor attended college in the U.S., must be nineteen or older on December 31
of the calendar year of the draft. Id.
9 Id.
'o See NBPA, Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. X, § 5(a) (1999), available at
http://www.nbpa.com/downloads/CBA.pdf; see also Michael A. McCann, Illegal Defense: The
Irrational Economics of Banning High School Players from the NBA Draft, 3 VA. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 113, 134 (2004) [hereinafter McCann, Illegal Defense] (providing additional detail on
previous eligibility regime).
" See Michael A. McCann, The Reckless Pursuit of Dominion: A Situational Analysis of
the NBA and Diminishing Player Autonomy, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. (forthcoming, 2006),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=878611 [hereinafter McCann,
The Reckless Pursuit of Dominion] (arguing that the NBA has a paternalistic policy of control-
ling players).
12 See generally McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note 10 (detailing the successes and fail-
ures of the twenty-nine high school players who declared for the NBA draft between 1975 and
2003); McCann, The Reckless Pursuit of Dominion, supra note 11 (manuscript at 20-26) (noting
that players out of high school get in trouble with the law at a lower frequency than players who
attended college and are also more likely to be drafted).
13 See McCann, The Reckless Pursuit of Dominion, supra note Il (manuscript at 17) (not-
ing that the expectation is that players will attend college for at least one season before declaring
eligibility for the draft).
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players develop skills without financial compensation. Moreover, by
preventing talented players from entering the NBA, the rule also en-
ables more fringe NBA players to keep their jobs. Obviously, the rule
comes at an extraordinary expense to the often-impoverished pre-
miere high school players who would rather generate revenue for
their families than the schools, coaches, shoe companies, television
networks, videogame companies, and other industry actors that profit
considerably from fan interest in college basketball. 14 More contro-
versially, the rule may also reflect a situational usurpation of player
autonomy by the NBA, 15 or underlying societal prejudice, particularly
when juxtaposing the experiences of premiere young basketball play-
ers with those of other young athletes and entertainers who enjoy
similar capacities to earn high incomes without having to encounter
the same social rebuke and paternalistic desire for legal intervention
"on their behalf."' 6
II. ANTITRUST LAW AND AGE ELIGIBILITY RULES
IN THE NFL AND NBA
Challenges to age eligibility restrictions arise under federal anti-
trust laws, and specifically the Sherman Antitrust Act (the "Sherman
Act"). 17 Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits agreements
that unreasonably restrain trade, supplies the primary source of litiga-
tion. There are three requirements for a viable section 1 claim: (1) a
contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2) the contract, combination, or
conspiracy produced a restraint of trade; and (3) the restraint affected
trade or commerce among the several states.' 8 In most settings, re-
straints of trade concern the product market. In sports settings, how-
ever, they typically concern the labor market, that is, the market for
workers.
Alleged violations of section 1 are scrutinized by one of three legal
standards. "Rule of reason," in which an agreement is deemed
unlawful if it causes an anticompetitive injury that outweighs pro-
14 See McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note 10, at 138-56 (illustrating the financial suc-
cess of high school players in the NBA).
's See McCann, The Reckless Pursuit of Dominion, supra note 11 (highlighting the nu-
merous ways in which the NBA limits or usurps player autonomy, including age eligibility
requirements for the NBA draft).
16 See Michael McCann, Michelle Wie and Lebron James: Why Are They Any Different?,
SPORTS LAW BLOG, Oct. 20, 2005, http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2005/10/michelle-wie-and-
lebron-james-why-are.htiml (contemplating possible role of race in the NBA age eligibility rule).
17 Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000); see also Kieran M. Corcoran, Note,
When Does the Buzzer Sound?: The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 1045, 1053-56 (1994) (supplying analysis of Sherman Act in context of profes-
sional sports).
"s 15 U.S.C. § 1.
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competitive effects, offers one standard.19 The rule of reason standard
attempts to ensure sufficient economic competition within a
marketplace and courts often consider the presence or possibility of
less restrictive mechanisms that may achieve the same pro-
competitive effects.2°
In contrast, under "per se" analysis, the defendant's practices are
presumed unreasonable, and illegality follows regardless of pro-
competitive effects or motive. Common practices that warrant per se
treatment are group boycotts, price-fixing schemes, and horizontal
market divisions.2 ' Per se analysis has become the more common
standard for violations of section 1.22
More recently, courts have developed a hybrid form of scrutiny-
the "quick look" rule of reason, which blends rule of reason and per
se analyses and preserves per se's presumption of unreasonable prac-
tices, but considers likely anticompetitive effects, market power, and
efficiencies "to the degree necessary to understand a challenged re-
straint's competitive consequences. 23 Some commentators regard
quick look as particularly useful in sports antitrust disputes, as it may
furnish a desirable balance between the interests of leagues and play-
'9 Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (describing the evo-
lution of the Rule of Reason and explaining the rule's focus on the competitive significance of a
restraint).
20 See generally Ernest Gellhorn & Teresa Tatham, Making Sense Out of the Rule of Rea-
son, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 155 (1985); Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the
Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 77 (2003). For instance, in the setting of a group boycott,
courts either hold the anticompetitive effects of the agreement exceeded its procompetitive
effects or the businesses could have employed less restrictive ways to obtain the same procom-
petitive effects. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979)
(holding that a blanket licensing agreement is not a per se violation of the Sherman Act and
remanding for the court of appeals to further consider the specifics of the industry); Bd. of Trade
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (holding that an agreement that restrains trade does not
necessarily violate the antitrust laws and that courts must consider various factors specific to the
industry to determine whether the agreement actually suppresses competition).
22 See, e.g., Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationary Printing Co., 472 U.S. 85
(1985) (holding that a group boycott is a per se violation of the Sherman Act); Arizona v. Mari-
copa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (finding fee agreements among physicians to be
an example of price fixing and therefore a per se violation of the Sherman Act); United States v.
Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (finding a horizontal market division to be a per se
violation of the Sherman Act).
22 See Richard A. Epstein, Let "The Fundamental Things Apply": Necessary and Contin-
gent Truths in Legal Scholarship, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1288, 1298 (2002) (noting "the shift from
a per se rule to a rule of reason regime was not motivated by altruism, but by the inability of
fixed rules to distinguish restrictive from efficiency-enhancing arrangements").
23 William E. Cohen, Per Se Illegality and Truncated Rule of Reason: The Search for a
Foreshortened Antitrust Analysis, FTC STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT (1997), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/jointvent/persepap.htm (discussing the quick look rule of reason in
section III); see also Mark C. Anderson, Self-Regulation and League Rules Under the Sherman
Act, 30 CAP. U. L. REv. 125, 130-31 (2002) (noting how quick look rule of reason "avoids
automatic condemnation of a restraint but does not require an in-depth analysis to evaluate the
restraint").
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ers. 24 Indeed, in applying quick look, courts may avoid automatically
rejecting a league regulation of player activities, but nevertheless ex-
amine its anticompetitive effects with heightened scrutiny.25
Though courts apply per se analysis to most alleged violations of
section 1, they tend to regard sports leagues as functionally unique
and better suited for either rule of reason analysis or quick look rule
of reason analysis.26 Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,27 a 1978 decision
from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
illuminated reasons for this distinction.28 Smith addressed the NFL
draft, and whether it comprised a group boycott, or an illegal attempt
by a group of economic actors to coerce a third party into particular
behavior. 29 The D.C. Court of Appeals reasoned that NFL teams rep-
resent joint ventures in a "shared pursuit" (i.e., the success of the
NFL), and therefore the NFL draft should not constitute a group boy-
cott.30 For that reason, per se violations were not identified.3 '
To characterize the concept of "shared pursuit" perhaps more
meaningfully, consider that NFL teams, like teams in other profes-
sional sports leagues, are not competitors in a traditional economic
sense (e.g., Company A and Company B both making widgets, having
no affiliations with each other, and joining hands to restrain trade).
Instead, NFL teams ostensibly employ a draft to ensure competition,
much like a salary cap or tampering rules 32 ostensibly promote com-
petition. For that reason, the NFL draft superficially appears to pro-
24 See, e.g., Daniel E. Lazaroff, Sports Equipment Standardization: An Antitrust Analysis,
34 GA. L. REV. 137, 147-48 (1999); see also Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph Winter, Antitrust Prin-
ciples and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1 (1971)
(discussing interplay between antitrust and labor law in professional sports).25 See Lazaroff, supra note 24, at 148-49 nn.41-43.
26 See id. at 148 (finding that courts "generally reject reliance on per se principles and al-
most always require plaintiffs to satisfy the full-blown rule of reason standard").
27 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
28 1d; see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (ruling that the per se rule is
not applicable to the NCAA and that per se violations of antitrust laws are not well-suited for
the sports setting).
29 See Charles F. Barber, Refusals To Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA.
L. REV. 847, 872-76 (1955) (discussing the Court's analysis of group boycotts and coercion).
'0 Smith, 593 F.2d at 1178-79.
31 See also Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F. 3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002). In Fraser, a court
applied rule of reason analysis to a restraint on player movement in a professional soccer league,
leading to a characterization of sports teams as part of a "joint venture." Id. at 59. Significantly,
however, the court in part reasoned its conclusion on the fact that MLS players could play in
other countries for comparable or even better employment conditions. Id. at 63. Indeed, profes-
sional soccer in the United States is considered inferior to professional soccer in Europe and
South America. See Heike K. Sullivan, Comment, Fraser v. Major League Soccer: The MLS's
Single-Entity Structure Is a "Sham, " 73 TEMP. L. REV. 865, 901-02 (2000).32 Tampering rules prohibit negotiation with a player already under contract to another
NFL team. See Lisa J. Tobin-Rubio, Case Note, Eminent Domain and the Commerce Clause
Defense: City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1185, 1198 n.63 (1987).
[Vol. 56:3
2006] LEGALITY OF AGE RESTRICTIONS IN THE NBA AND NFL 137
mote parity: it prevents franchises with the greatest resources from
attracting the best amateur talent year-after-year.3 3
The NFL draft, like the NBA draft and other professional sports
drafts, however, serves an ulterior motive. By preventing amateur
players from negotiating with multiple teams, it limits player salaries
and employment autonomy. For that reason, some commentators con-
tend that the NFL draft and other drafts comprise illegal mo-
nopsonies: a league controls the buying of talent, but not the selling,34
and it is the only source to which the players may sell their services.
Moreover, there exists substantial evidence that, if given a choice to
bargain with multiple teams, premiere amateur players would be sig-
nificantly animated by alternative, noneconomic preferences (e.g.,
geographic appeal, proximity to family and friends, playing time op-
portunities), as well as cognitive biases and heuristics-meaning the
ostensible aim of parity through a draft may be achieved through far
less restrictive means.3 5 Therefore, the NFL draft and the NBA draft
arguably reflect both illegal and unnecessary mechanisms.
But assuming, arguendo, that the NFL draft and NBA draft reflect
necessary shared pursuits, their corresponding rules are not insulated
from legal scrutiny, particularly when they appear arbitrary and in-
flexible. Indeed, courts appear especially weary of blanket bans on
particular demographic groups who would otherwise attract interest
from teams. Such bans are thought to evidence unreasonable re-
straints of trade (or preclusions of access), especially in the absence
of collective bargaining.36
In construing their draft rules as mechanisms to preserve
competition rather than as restraints of trade, sports leagues seek to
avoid antitrust scrutiny of those rules. Utilization of the "nonstatutory
labor exemption," which shields collective bargaining processes from
antitrust scrutiny, supplies the primary means of escaping antitrust
inquiry. 37 Sufficient collective bargaining processes arise between
duly elected representatives of management and labor groups, with
labor representatives thought to "harmonize and adjust the conflicting
interests of employees within the bargaining unit, no matter how
33 See, e.g., Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Profes-
sional Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 934-35 (1999).
34 Alan C. Milstein, Reggie Bush Sweepstakes, SPORTS LAW BLOG, Dec. 29, 2005,
http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2005/12/reggie-bush-sweepstakes.html.
35 See Michael A. McCann, It's Not About the Money: The Role of Preferences, Cognitive
Biases and Heuristics Among Professional Athletes, 71 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=822864.
36 See McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note 10, at 220 and accompanying notes.
37 E.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 235-36 (1996).
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diverse their skills, experience, age, race or economic level."38 The
labor exemption is premised on the belief that employees are better
off negotiating together than individually, particularly when
negotiating wages, hours, and other working conditions.39 Because
the labor exemption exempts collectively bargained rules from
antitrust scrutiny, leagues are motivated to collectively bargain rules
with their players. The same negotiating incentives exist in any
relationship between distinct bargaining units, such as between car
manufacturers and automobile unions, or airline companies and
airline mechanics' unions.4°
As set forth by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit in
Mackey v. NFL4' challenging the NFL's so-called Rozelle Rule,42 ap-
plication of the labor exemption in lieu of antitrust laws requires that
the restraint of trade: (1) primarily affects only parties to the related
collective bargaining agreement; (2) reflects a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining, that is, wages, hours, and other terms and con-
ditions of employment; and (3) emerged from bona fide arms-length
bargaining ("the Mackey Test").43 The Mackey Test has proven espe-
cially influential in challenges to age eligibility rules. As we will dis-
cuss, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreted the
Mackey Test so as to prevent application of antitrust laws in Clarett v.
NFL.44 Moreover, if the new NBA age eligibility rule were chal-
lenged, the NBA would likely construe Mackey as warranting the
rule's exclusion from antitrust scrutiny. Indeed, given the remarkable
success of NBA players who have bypassed college, the absence of
equivalent employers to NBA teams, and the inflexible nature of an
arbitrary age floor, the NBA would likely lose any challenge if anti-
trust scrutiny were applied.45
Of course, it remains a lingering and fascinating question as to
why sports leagues and players' associations are treated as legal
equivalents to companies and unions in traditional collective bargain-
ing relationships. One might query why, for instance, the law treats
the Ford Motor Company, one of many automakers, roughly the same
38 ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 379 (1976).
39 See, e.g., NLRB v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
40 See David Abraham, Individual Autonomy and Collective Empowerment in Labor Law:
Union Membership Resignations and Strikebreaking in the New Economy, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1268 (1988).
41 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
42 The Rozelle Rule required NFL clubs to compensate any club from which they hired
away a player whose contract had expired. Id. at 609.
43 Id.
4 369 F.3d at 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
41 McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note 10, at IlI (B).
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as the NFL or the NBA, neither of which have a rival, or why mil-
lionaire NFL and NBA players, whose careers tend to last just four or
five years, are treated akin to Ford assembly line workers, who might
work for forty-five years and never earn what some NFL or NBA
players earn in one year.46 This uniform style of scrutiny may reflect
appreciation for precedent, as well as genuine concern that a separate
method of scrutiny for collective bargaining agreements between pro-
fessional sports leagues and professional athletes could unintention-
ally impair the collective bargaining of other groups. Nevertheless, a
matching legal treatment for two wildly different sets of actors may
suggest an area for future judicial inquiry, particularly given a poten-
tial disconnect between "the legal" and "the normative" in collec-
tively bargained age eligibility rules.
III. CHALLENGES TO NFL AND NBA AGE ELIGIBILITY RULES
Eligibility cases concerning age and the NFL and NBA drafts
illuminate salient limitations on draft rulemaking. Denver Rockets v.
All-Pro Management,47 a 1971 decision from the U.S. Federal District
Court for the District of California, supplies an important initial
insight into how courts contemplate age and the NBA draft.4 At that
time, the NBA required that players be four years removed from high
school in order to participate in the NBA draft. The rule had not been
collectively bargained. Spencer Haywood, a nineteen-year-old
basketball star from an impoverished family, challenged the rule. He
characterized it as an unreasonable restraint of trade.49 The court
agreed with Haywood, finding that the age requirement constituted a
per se illegal boycott. 50 Central to the court's decision was the
inflexible nature and arbitrariness of the rule, for it failed to provide
an exception for unique talent or financial circumstance.5 1 In other
words, a blanket age floor to draft entry comprised illegal per se
activity.
Similar reasoning emerged in Boris v. United States Football
League,52 in which a federal district court held that a professional
football league could not unilaterally impose a rule requiring that a
4 See Michael McCann, Legal Aftermath of New NBA Age Limit, SPORTS LAW BLOG,
Jan. 4, 2006, http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2006/01/legal-aftermath-of-new-nba-age-limit.
html.
47 325 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Cal. 1971).
48 Id.
49 For more on Haywood, see McCann, Illegal Defense, supra note 10, at 216-19.
50 Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066.
s' Id. at 1064-65.
52 1984 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 66,012, (D. Cal. 1984).
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player complete college before entering its draft.53 By doing so, the
court concluded, the league engaged in an illegal group boycott of
amateur players unable or unwilling to complete college.54 As in
Denver Rockets, the inflexible nature of a uniform age requirement
proved over-inclusive and unacceptably harmful to prospective
players.55
Analogous lines of reasoning have been evidenced in the litigation
of age restrictions in other professional sports leagues. For instance,
in Linesman v. World Hockey Association,56 a federal district court
held that a league-imposed rule requiring that players be twenty-
years-old constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade. The court
enunciated that teams cannot, as a matter of law, conspire to boycott
all players under a particular age. 57
Arguably the most crucial decision concerning age and profes-
sional sports eligibility occurred in 2004: Clarett v. NFL.58 In Clarett,
Ohio State running back Maurice Clarett sought to participate in the
NFL draft before the three-year anniversary of his high school
graduation. Growing up in a financially hard-pressed family from
nearby Youngstown, Ohio, Clarett was an extraordinary player for the
Buckeyes. As a freshman, he led the team to a national championship,
established player performance records, 59 and was named by The
Sporting News as the top running back in college football.6° Clarett
was so impressive that his Ohio State jersey rapidly sold-out of
stores-a great benefit to his school, which received the revenue from
these sales, though Clarett, as an NCAA student-athlete, received
nothing.61 For reasons discussed in the question/answer portion of this
Essay, Ohio State suspended Clarett for his sophomore season in
2003.62
53 Id.
541id.
55 Id.
56 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977)
51 Id. at 1320.
5' 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir.), rev'g Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). For
two excellent student pieces discussing Clarett, see Scott A. Freedman, Comment, An End Run
Around Antitrust Law: The Second Circuit's Blanket Application of the Non-Statutory Labor
Exemption in Clarett v. NFL, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 155 (2004) and Nicholas E. Wurth,
Article, The Legality of an Age-Requirement in the National Basketball League After the Second
Circuit's Decision in Clarett v. NFL, 3 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (2005).
59 See Austin Murphy, Mighty Mo: Precocious Freshman Tailback Maurice Clarett Made
His Presence Felt-On and Off the Field, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 15, 2003, at 12; see also
Bruce Lowitt, Buckeyes Running Back in a Big Hurry, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 29, 2002,
at IC (supplying additional information on Maurice Clarett's record-breaking feats).
60 See Brief for Appellees, at 9, Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 379 (on file with authors).
61 See Alice Thomas, Clarett "13" Jerseys Likely To Be Popular This Fall, Stores Say,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 17, 2003, at D7.62 See infra pp. 752-53. Below, Alan C. Milstein discusses suspension and disconnect be-
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Seeking to enter the 2004 NFL draft before the requisite three-year
anniversary, Clarett sued the NFL in September 2003, characterizing
its age eligibility rule as an unreasonable restraint of trade under sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The case was heard before Judge
Scheindlin of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York. Clarett knew that if he was eligible for the 2004 NFL draft, he
would likely be drafted in the first or second round,63 thus securing a
signing bonus in excess of one million dollars. 64 Clarett also found it
profoundly unfair that others could profit so considerably from his
talents, while he and his family remained impoverished.
Clarett argued that the NFL age eligibility rule failed the Mackey
Test on each of its three prongs, and thus warranted antitrust scrutiny.
First, the only people subjected to the NFL age eligibility rule were
him and similarly situated athletes excluded from the bargaining unit
and thus prevented from obtaining the terms and conditions of NFL
employment.6 Indeed, the rule does not concern the rights of any
NFL players or draftees; rather, it concerns only those individuals
who, because of it, cannot become NFL players or draftees. For that
reason, Clarett asserted, the rule should be distinguished from rules
designed to promote competition, such as a salary cap or drug testing
policies since they, unlike the age eligibility rule, obviously concern
parties to the collective bargaining agreement.66 Thus, Clarett sought
to characterize the rule as failing the first prong of the Mackey Test: it
does not primarily affect only parties to the collective bargaining
agreement.6 7
In response, the NFL contended that in other collectively bar-
gained settings, management and unions had established prerequisites
for entry that deny certain parties. In that regard, the NFL preferred
that Clarett be viewed as "no different from the typical worker who is
confident that he or she has the skills to fill a job vacancy but does not
possess the qualifications or meet the requisite criteria that have been
set. ' '68 On the other hand, as Clarett noted, this argument failed in
various settings in which strangers to the bargaining unit were also
tween media coverage of suspension and actual reasons for suspensions.
63 This view was corroborated by external observers. See, e.g., Rob Oiler, Clarett Could
Face Legal Snag Before NFL Draft, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 18, 2004, at El (citing report
that the Chicago Bears hoped to select Clarett in the second round).
64 See Dave Anderson, Sports of the Times: For Clarett, How Early Equals How Much,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2003, at 3 (discussing the signing bonuses of players picked during the
2003 draft).
65 See Brief for Appellees, supra note 60, at 12.
66 Id. at 22-23.
67 See infra p. 738.
68 Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
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excluded.69 Nevertheless, the NFL insisted that the "shared pursuit"
of NFL teams dictates the need for multi-employer bargaining with
the NFLPA (NFL players' association), including in bargaining rules
affecting prospective employees. In that respect, according to the
NFL, age eligibility rules should be considered comparable to other
rules ostensibly designed to promote successful league operations,
such as the number of games, length of season, roster size, and roster
composition.7 °
Clarett's second argument was aimed at the second prong of the
Mackey Test: the NFL age eligibility rule does not concern a manda-
tory subject of collective bargaining. More specifically, Clarett ar-
gued that unlike the NFL draft itself, which governs the method by
which players enter the bargaining unit, the NFL age eligibility rule
precludes certain nonemployees from applying for employment.71
Moreover, Clarett alleged that the rule does not "vitally affect" the
jobs of veteran players or their wages: Clarett would have simply took
the place of another draft eligible player, and, like that player, Clarett
would have ultimately competed against a veteran player for a roster
spot.72 Indeed, Clarett never challenged the legality of the NFL draft
or how it governs those outside the bargaining unit who enter the
NFL. Instead, he posited that a rule that precludes nonemployees
from applying for employment does not concern a mandatory subject
of collective bargaining.
In response, the NFL claimed that its age eligibility rule vitally af-
fects current players' terms and employment, as Clarett would have
replaced the job of a veteran player, and because his relatively lower
salary would count in formulation of the league salary cap, his en-
trance into the NFL would reduce the wages of players in the
NFLPA.73 Of course, the NFL's argument appeared circular: whether
or not Clarett and similarly situated players were eligible for the draft,
each team would still draft and sign the same number of players, who
would compete for jobs presently held by veteran players. Along
those lines, if Clarett and similarly situated players were eligible, they
would have simply replaced other players drafted, and presumably
those selected at the very end of the draft.
69 See Brief for Appellees, supra note 60, at 21 (citing Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945)).
70 Id. at 21 (citing NBA v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 689 (2d Cir. 1995)).
"' Id. at 25-26.72 Id. at 27; see also infra pp. 746-48 (discussing significance of Maurice Clarett replacing
one player in the NFL draft).
73 Brief for Appellees, supra note 60, at 26.
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Lastly, Clarett argued that the NFL's age eligibility rule was nei-
ther collectively bargained for nor the product of arms-length negotia-
tion. Indeed, the 292-page collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
between the NFLMC (NFL Management Council) and the NFLPA,
which was signed in 1993 and not revised until March 2006, did not
contain the rule.74 Instead, the rule's primary support derives from a
non-collectively bargained memorandum unilaterally issued by the
NFL commissioner to teams in 1990--three years before the CBA-
but, tellingly, not issued to the NFLPA and only of concern to the
1990 NFL draft.75
In response, the NFL argued that although its collective bargaining
agreement with the NFLPA does not expressly mention the age eligi-
bility rule, sufficient collective bargaining emerged as a result of the
existence of a side letter from the NFL's counsel to a counter-part at
the NFLPA in 1992 .76 This letter asserted, without reference or appar-
ent proof, that the age eligibility rule had been collectively bar-
gained.77 The letter was attached to the 1992 NFL Bylaws, which
were ultimately incorporated into the CBA (the NFL proffered this
argument even though the 1992 NFL Bylaws were replaced in 2003,
and the 2003 NFL Bylaws mention only the memorandum and not the
letter).7 8
In applying the three-prong Mackey Test, Judge Scheindlin agreed
with Clarett's reasoning that the NFL age eligibility rule failed each
of the three prongs.79 Consequently, the rule lost protection from the
labor exemption and was subjected to antitrust scrutiny.
Employing quick look rule of reason analysis, Judge Scheindlin
held, among other points adverse to the NFL, that: (1) the rule pro-
cured obvious anticompetitive effects by prohibiting access to all
players who failed to satisfy the rule; (2) the NFL's pro-competitive
arguments failed because the rule, which prevented access to talented
players, did not promote economic competition in the labor market;
and (3) assuming, arguendo, that the NFL possessed legitimate pro-
competitive arguments, there existed far less restrictive alternatives to
an inflexible and arbitrary rule tied to age particularly since, as the
NFL's own affiant conceded, "the 'timeframe' for a player's physical
74 See Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the NFL Management Council and the
NFL Players Association (1998), http://www.nflpa.orgIMembers/main.asp?subPage
= C BA+
Complete#intro.
75 See Brief for Appellees, supra note 60, at 4.
76 Id. at 5.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 7-8.
79 See generally Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d. 379 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 369 F.3d 124 (2d
Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
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and psychological maturation 'varies from individual to individ-
ual."' 80 Drawing on themes raised in Denver Rockets, Judge
Scheindlin intimated that less restrictive alternatives could include an
exception for unique talent or financial circumstance, or simply case-
by-case analyses of prospective draft picks. As a result, the NFL age
eligibility rule was found to comprise an illegal group boycott under
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 81 Judge Scheindlin granted summary
judgment in favor of Clarett and ordered that he be allowed to partici-
pate in the 2004 NFL draft.82
Clarett's victory proved fleeting, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed the district court.83 Although the three-
prong Mackey Test had been regularly applied in the Second Circuit,
the Court of Appeals considered it noncontrolling, and only cursorily
applied it to the facts.84 Writing for the three-judge panel, Judge So-
tomayor held that the rule warranted protection under the labor excep-
tion. Her opinion asserted that the NFL age eligibility rule comprised
a mandatory bargaining subject since it pertained to initial employ-
ment; Clarett and similarly situated players would procure a tangible
effect on the wages and working conditions of the current NFL play-
ers; and sufficient collective bargaining was primarily established by
the NFLPA's agreement to waive any challenge to the NFL Bylaws.
As a result of the Second Circuit's holding, the NFL deemed
Clarett ineligible for the 2004 NFL draft. 6 He and a similarly situated
player, Mike Williams of the University of Southern California, faced
a predicament: they could not participate in the 2004 NFL draft, but
they had forfeited their NCAA eligibility by signing with agents.87
Neither played organized football in 2004, but both were drafted in
the 2005 NFL draft. 8 Williams now plays for the Detroit Lions, while
Clarett is not presently a member of an NFL team.89
'o Id. at410.
sl Id. at 404-05.
82 Id. at 410-11.
83 Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
84 Id
85 Id at 142.
86 After the Second Circuit's holding, Clarett filed a writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, but it was denied. Clarett, 125 S. Ct. 1728.87 See Carol Slezak, Illegal-Procedure Call on USC's Williams Unjust, CHI. SuN-TIMES,
Aug. 31, 2004, at 110.
88 Mike Williams was selected in the first round, 10th overall, by the Detroit Lions while
Maurice Clarett was selected in the third round, 101st overall, by the Denver Broncos. 2005
NFL Draft, available at http://www.nfl.com/draft/history/years/2005.
89 Clarett was released by the Denver Broncos in August 2005 and has not, as of this writ-
ing, joined another NFL team.
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IV. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT LAW AND AGE ELIGIBILITY IN
THE NFL AND NBA
At this point in the Essay, we turn to our statements during the
Symposium, as they may vary considerably. The statements concern
Clarett and broader issues of age eligibility in the NFL and NBA.
Alan C. Milstein also participated in the discussion. Please note: Alan
C. Milstein and Michael A. McCann litigated on behalf of Maurice
Clarett in Clarett and Joseph S. Rosen represents professional ath-
letes, though, in the opinion of his coauthor and doubtlessly the audi-
ence, moderated the debate with remarkable fairness.
Reaction to Clarett v. NFL
MR. MILSTEIN: When considering the Second Circuit's opinion
in Clarett, I found it telling how only a very weak and very short por-
tion of it addressed the three Mackey factors. The court surmised that
the labor exemption should apply to any case in which someone from
labor alleges an antitrust violation. The court interpreted Brown v.
Pro Football as meaning that, so long as there is a bargaining unit and
a collective bargaining agreement, a court will not hear any case in
which an employee challenges a rule--even if the subject is not a part
of the agreement. 90
MR. McCANN: Along those lines, the Second Circuit appeared to
endorse a simplistic valuation of form over substance, which, as a
matter of precedent, can set undesirable parameters for union-
management negotiations. For one, it would seem to beget incentives
for existing players to readily sacrifice the interests of prospective
players. And two, it may catalyze existing employees to pursue poli-
cies that conflict with their negotiating unit's long-term interests.
MR. MILSTEIN: And just consider what happened when the
United States Football League (USFL) broke up in 1986. The NFL, in
conjunction with the NFLPA, determined that players from the then-
defunct USFL could only play in the NFL if they partook in an
expansion draft. One of the USFL players challenged this decision
because he wanted to become a free agent. But the court ruled that
under the labor exemption, the NFL and NFLPA could agree that
players are subject to the draft.
But let us suppose the facts were different: suppose the NFL and
the NFLPA decided that they really hated the USFL. And when the
USFL broke up, they decided to set a rule that bans USFL players
from ever entering the NFL. That rule would so obviously comprise
90 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 131 (referencing Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996)).
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an antitrust violation and yet it cannot be challenged under the Second
Circuit's reasoning in Clarett.
MR. McCANN: With that in mind, consider just how boundless a
scope of negotiating autonomy the Second Circuit provided to exist-
ing members of negotiating units and, more importantly, how that
scope may prevent antitrust law from acting as both a safeguard and a
deterrent. Really, why bother having antitrust protection when it can
be so readily avoided?
Wages, Rights, and Clarett v. NFL
MR. ROSEN [MODERATOR]: Remember that Alan and Mike
are advocates, so please, be advocates as well. And we could espe-
cially use advocates who take the NFL's side. I will even try to be one
of them.
What is the main problem with the NFL using the labor exemption
as a defense in Clarett? Why was the Second Circuit wrong in agree-
ing with the NFL on that point? We are talking about mandatory sub-
jects of collective bargaining and how the age eligibility rule affects
wages.
MR. MILSTEIN: No, we are not. The rule does not affect wages.
MR. ROSEN: Of course it affects wages; it affects every player's
wages when you do not allow certain people into the league.
MR. MILSTEIN: Sure, the NFL claimed that the rule affects peo-
ple in the draft. But it does not. Clarett would have only replaced the
last person in the 2004 draft, which included 255 players selected.
The same number of persons (255) would still have been drafted, with
one player, the last person who would have otherwise been selected,
dropping out. The same wage scale for the first round, the second
round, the third round, etc., would have existed. All that happens is
that if Maurice happened to have been a first-round pick, then he
would have received first-round money. Nobody is excluded except
the very last person in the draft. So it does not affect wages, it is not a
term of employment, and it is not a condition of employment. The
court totally misread the phrase "condition of employment." Condi-
tion of employment does not mean you could be employed if you sat-
isfy these requirements. Condition of employment considers existing
employment conditions like locker room facilities, field safety, and
those types of considerations. So age eligibility is not a condition of
employment and Maurice and other college athletes were clearly out-
side of the bargaining unit. The age eligibility rule is aimed at those
who are not within the labor organization.
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MR. McCANN: And players not within the labor organization
have no one at the bargaining table. Obviously, existing players have
an interest in keeping top amateur players out of the NFL because
doing so preserves existing jobs that would otherwise go to better,
younger players. That consideration is especially salient for marginal
veteran players who would otherwise fall out of the labor market. So
we have to wonder, who is looking out for the legal interests of pro-
spective players when both negotiating units-the NFL and the
NFLPA-negotiate to their adverse interests?
MR. ROSEN: But it does affect wages. Mike Williams is a better
example because he, unlike Clarett, is on an NFL roster right now.
Williams was a wide receiver at the University of Southern Califor-
nia. He was not involved in the Clarett appeal but he waited to see
what happened. Williams was a first-round draft pick in the 2005
draft, and that affected NFL wages regardless of the last pick of the
draft. Yes, Williams' inclusion moved everybody down one spot, but
also, by entering the league, he affected the wages of another wide
receiver on his NFL roster. When he joined the Detroit Lions, one
wide receiver had to be cut and his wages were going to be affected
because Mike Williams was on that roster. So the wages are affected.
MR. McCANN: But the aggregate wages are not.
MR. ROSEN: The individual wages are. It is just wages. It does
not say aggregate wages. It says wages.
MR. McCANN: But typically, antitrust law has not been applied to
protect the interest of one employee and that is the fact-pattern that
you are describing. Courts consider the broader scope of persons and
parties being affected. They look at patterns and systemic effects.
And to have the Lions' worst wide-receiver-who is probably lucky
to even be on the team and he probably will not keep his job long any
way-be the one person adversely affected, that would seem highly
unlikely to trigger a viable antitrust claim.
MR. ROSEN: We are not talking necessarily about a team's worst
wide-receiver because we all know how the NFL works. When Mike
Williams came to the Detroit Lions, who was released? Az-Zahir Ha-
kim, who is a good wide receiver now with the New Orleans Saints
and his wages were affected.
The way the NFL works, teams are going to keep that last receiver
because he is going to be the guy on the practice squad or the special
teams unit who is making $100,000 a year and they are going to get
rid of Hakim who is making $1 million a year. Now he has gone to
the Saints and is making $400,000 a year. So his wages are affected.
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MR. McCANN: But in that instance, if Az-Zahir Hakim had actu-
ally been good, he would not have been cut. The Lions let go of the
player whom they least wanted to keep, and his name was Az-Zahir
Hakim. And at the end of the day, that is not an employee with tre-
mendous rights under antitrust law.
MR. MILSTEIN: Az-Zahir Hakim has no rights. We are talking
about a player who just wants to be in the NFL but is prevented from
competing for a job. He is a clear loser under this case. Az-Zahir Ha-
kim, on the other hand, cannot claim an antitrust violation. He is lost
in the normal competition of the draft. That is not what happened with
Maurice. Maurice was not allowed to compete.
Legitimacy of Eligibility Rules in the NFL and NBA
MR. MILSTEIN: Let us address the essential underlying topic:
why is there an eligibility rule in the NFL and NBA and nowhere
else? There is no such rule in tennis, golf, or hockey. The NFL said
that the rule is to protect the players, but compared to hockey, the
NFL is like a game of tennis.
MR. McCANN: And what about boxing? You can be eighteen-
years-old and box professionally. You can get punched in the head
repeatedly, and you can punch someone else in the head repeatedly.
You are somehow mature enough to pound one another in the head,
but not mature enough to catch a pass out of the backfield or dunk a
basketball and cash a paycheck at the same time?
MR. MILSTEIN: As another analogy, suppose you had a kicker in
high school that could kick sixty-five-yard field goals. Tell me why
he cannot go from high school to the pros? Who are you protecting?
What is the reason? Why only basketball and football? What do bas-
ketball and football have in common?
AUDIENCE: The NCAA is what they have in common.
MR. MILSTEIN: Right. And the entire basis of these eligibility
rules is to perpetuate that system in which players, who are otherwise
eligible to make money and earn a living, are forced to work for noth-
ing. And not only work for nothing, but risk career ending injuries
after which they will never earn anything and nobody will take care
of them.
AUDIENCE: Are you advocating a system like baseball, where
there is a minor league system for player development, because, ob-
viously, somebody has to develop those players? Are you saying then
that there should be minor leagues for basketball and football?
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MR. MILSTEIN: Well, I think that is up to the NFL and the NBA.
But the fact is that there are no minor leagues; the minor leagues are
the NCAA.
AUDIENCE: That is correct.
MR. ROSEN: But the NBA is trying to implement a minor-league
system.
MR. MILSTEIN: The NFL is also trying, supposedly, with NFL
Europe. But we are just talking about such a small number of play-
ers from the NFL who would make it from high school into col-
lege, or perhaps after their first or second year of college. I do not
think you have to have a minor league in order to perpetuate a sys-
tem in which players are forced to work without compensation in
the NCAA. And then you have a kid who grew up poor, this kid who
has no money is offered money from alumni and made to feel like a
criminal if he takes it just because he wants to live like any other stu-
dent. How can you possibly justify saying that he cannot earn a
living when he is able to? It is just an outrage to me.
Compensating College Athletes
AUDIENCE: What are your thoughts, then, on having colleges
pay for athletes?
MR. MILSTE1N: It would be an impossible situation for colleges
to pay athletes. But college athletes should be able to make deals with
Nike and enter similar deals if their image is sold on merchandise.
Consider this for a moment: Ohio State sold more Ohio State Clarett
jerseys than it sold for any other player in school history. Maurice did
not get a dollar out of that. Why not?
MR. McCANN: And if Michele Wie is mature enough as a six-
teen-year-old to enter into multimillion dollar endorsement deals, then
why is not Maurice Clarett not mature enough at twenty or twenty-
one able to do the same? What is the difference? Why do we cast sus-
picions on young basketball and football players who seek endorse-
ment deals, while we praise young golfers and young tennis players,
or young actors and young singers who do the same?
MR. ROSEN: The problem with paying college athletes is how
you would do it. Who gets paid? Is it just the money-making teams?
The football teams and the basketball teams are generally the only
way that any college can make money. The revenue they generate
supports other teams at those universities. So should only the football
players and basketball players get paid? That arrangement would not
work with Title IX. So should every college athlete, every softball
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player, and every gymnast-should they all be paid? The NCAA
would obviously not go for that.
MR. MILSTEIN: These programs cost a lot of money. Right now
in the state of Ohio, there are two professional football teams, the
Cincinnati Bengals and the Ohio State Buckeyes. Just think about
that. (Laughter.) The Browns are still in the minor leagues.
MR. PETER CARFAGNA [SYMPOSIUM CHAIR]: I would like
to throw another log on the fire to get ahead with the baseball panel.
How is it that someone like Drew Henson can go ahead and get paid
to play minor league baseball and still maintain his eligibility to play
football for Michigan? Does that make your point or deny your point?
MR. MILSTEIN: The reason Drew Henson or Quincy Carter or
Ricky Williams can go play baseball in the minor leagues and then
come back and remain eligible for college football is because the
NCAA has decided that they can. That is really the answer. Those
players were able to go play one sport professionally, but retained
their eligibility in another sport. What you cannot do is go get en-
dorsement deals because the NCAA has determined that they have no
idea what those endorsement deals were for. Jeremy Bloom was a
skier and a football player. His endorsements were for skiing, gener-
ally, but the NCAA said they could not determine that the endorse-
ment deals were for skiing and not for football.
Age as a Proxy
MR. MILSTEIN: There is no other field of endeavor in which age
determines whether or not you can earn your living. The Olsen twins
can earn millions and millions of dollars and then go to NYU and par-
ticipate in the college drama program. Some violinists can get paid to
play with the New York Philharmonic and then go play in the college
orchestra.
MR. McCANN: Also, ask what age is. Age is a proxy. It suggests
certain things about certain people. It does not tell us specific things
about those persons, but it indicates our assumptions about them. For
instance, ask yourself why we have an eighteen-year-old floor for
voting. It is because we assume that persons under the age of eighteen
are not mature enough to vote, unlike those eighteen and over. But we
all know persons younger than eighteen who are more than preco-
cious enough to place a ballot. And we all know persons who are
older than eighteen who we do not want anywhere near a voting
booth. But for legal, practical, and ethical reasons, we cannot engage
in a person-by-person analysis of voting aptitude.
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In contrast, sports teams already enjoy information pertaining to
which players at which age should be drafted at which point in the
draft. Teams conduct exhaustive physical and cognitive evaluations to
determine whether or not a player should be drafted. For that reason,
drafting really is not about age-it is about others' ability to measure
talent. And think about that for a moment. Think about all those col-
lege juniors and seniors who were drafted high but ended up playing
poorly in the NBA. Rafael Araujo, Trajan Langdon, Ed O'Bannon,
Mateen Cleaves, Kirk Haston, Brandon Armstrong, Dahntay Jones,
Marcus Haislip, Reece Gaines, Marcus Banks-this list could go on
and on and on. These players were twenty-one- or twenty-two-years-
old when they entered the NBA. They had played three or four years
of college basketball where they had excelled. They had attracted the
keen interest of NBA scouts. And yet they proceeded to flop in the
NBA. Would an arbitrary age floor of nineteen- or twenty-years-old
have stopped any of them from being drafted? Obviously not. Too
bad the NBA could not have created a rule that protected itself from
drafting these guys.
And just the opposite, actually, we have repeatedly seen high
school players go straight to the NBA and excel. Not just Lebron
James and Tracy McGrady and Kevin Garnett, but also guys like
Amare Stoudemire, Jermaine O'Neal, Rashard Lewis, Al Harrington,
Eddy Curry, Dwight Howard, Al Jefferson, J.R. Smith, Josh Smith,
Sebastian Telfair-it is remarkable how many have done so well,
both on and off the court. And that goes to the fact that player eligibil-
ity should not be based on age, which is a red herring; it should be
about talent and others' ability to discern it. And that is why teams
expend vast resources trying to figure out which players are talented,
and they tend be more right when drafting younger players than older
players.
MR. MILSTEIN: I think we also have to understand why the
leagues have the rule, and why there is an antitrust violation. The
league is setting a rule. Why would they do that? Because the indi-
vidual teams, without the rule, would draft the young player. So the
coaches and the scouts have already determined, based on all the cri-
teria that they use, that this particular player is good enough to play
on my team, is good enough to make a lot of money and they want to
draft that player.
MR. McCANN: And that is why a proxy belies the whole system.
It does not make sense to conduct exhaustive pre-draft evaluations of
prospective draft picks, and then impose an arbitrary, absolute rule
that may exclude the optimal group of prospective draft picks.
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Clarett as a Person and Client
AUDIENCE: I have a question. Being a criminal lawyer, one of
the things that I thought handicapped you in representing Clarett was
that he was regarded as a snitch. What he said got a whole lot of peo-
ple in trouble, including the University, which was, of course, a diffi-
culty that you had to overcome. With my clients, I try to take them to
the theater before they get on the stand. Do not say this; do not do
this. Did you have that conversation with Maurice before he did some
of these things? Now, we were very sympathetic about what you were
talking about, his lower class background. But when he began to re-
veal some of the deals that he received, the coach did his part and put
the whole university on some kind of disciplinary thing. Do you not
think that also caused some animosity in the forum that you were rep-
resenting him in?
MR. MILSTEIN: We had already lost in the Second Circuit when
he disclosed information about Ohio State. One of the things that ini-
tially got him in trouble with the NCAA was that he wanted to protect
his coach during the investigation; he was not as candid as perhaps he
should have been when the NCAA questioned him. Maurice, at times,
was his own worst enemy. He is a very intelligent young man, but he
cannot take hypocrisy and does not deal with it well.
Everything started with Maurice back at the NCAA championship
when a friend of Maurice's from high school was killed. Maurice's
mother had a conversation with the coach and with the athletic direc-
tor. They told her that when Maurice goes with the team out to Cali-
fornia they would fly him back for the funeral. So the team went to
California and it came time to go to the funeral but they said no. They
said that they could not pay for the flight. And Maurice, publicly, be-
fore the NCAA championship game, called that outrageous. These
people do not understand that there is something more important in
life than football. And for an Ohio State football player getting ready
to play for a national championship, saying that was sacrilegious. And
after that is when the world started going downhill for Maurice. The
NCAA went after him; the school went after him; and the New York
Times went after him.
But that is not what the case was about. The teams wanted to draft
Maurice. They wanted to pay him a lot of money to play football and
there was an artificial rule that said, no, they could not do that.
MR. CARFAGNA: Why did he not bury the school when he was
given the chance?
AUDIENCE: Did you advise him to do what he did?
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MR. MILSTEIN: Well, I am not going to disclose attorney-client
privilege, but I can say this: there are clients that you can control;
there are clients that you cannot. Maurice was his own person and he
was determined to go his own way. That was one of things that im-
pressed Jim Brown so much about him. This was a young man who
was very articulate and just unwilling to take the hypocrisy of the
NCAA. The things that went on in Ohio State were just unbelievable.
Actually, not unbelievable. You all suspect that what goes on at a
school like Ohio State goes on. Everybody turns a blind eye. But if
the player happens to do anything wrong, the NCAA comes down
harshly. It is simply an absolutely outrageous system.
Education, Athletics, and Social Norms
AUDIENCE: When you look at Clarett's situation, he was desper-
ate. When you look at Lebron's situation, his father was in the peni-
tentiary. He had to make decisions for his mother. As lawyers, you
have to realize that on the field, in an NFL game, people are trying to
kill other players or end their career, on every play. The NFL and the
NBA are not sports like golf where people hit a ball. NFL and NBA
players are involved in different careers, and sometimes we do not
think about how we can protect them.
A lot of times when you say a kid is ready to have this type of
management, money, skills, any of those things, they are not pre-
pared. Sometimes it might take a little bit more time to try to help
develop them, to let them see that this is one potential way that he can
do better, by going through some of these systems, whether they
make a billion dollars or not. They may make it as a football player or
they may make it as a businessman or a as lawyer.
People are just so focused on becoming a professional athlete. And
we are losing all of that character that our society is supposed to be
trying to nurture and develop.
My question is: as you beat up on the NCAA and you look at the
NAACP, look at affirmative action and all these things that are out
there, are we really helping those kids as an agent or as a group of
lawyers when we say, can you take care of these things? Do we pre-
pare them? Are we preparing them before their time?
MR. CARFAGNA: Those are really provocative, really important
questions. That is the point I was making. Get that education if you
can. It is the old "break a leg" test and, as Arnold Palmer would say, I
could have played pro right out of high school, but I went to Wake
Forest. Why? Because he wanted to avoid that arrested development
thing. And those were the most fun years of his life, making those
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bonds with his college teammates. Golf is not a team sport, but as he
would say, that is how he learned to be a businessman. That is how he
learned to make even more off the course than he would make on the
course. That is the point I was trying to make. Education is the thing
and if you can get it paid for, you are set for life if you can never play
your sport again.
MR. McCANN: I think you have identified the right aspiration. I
agree that education, as a general matter, is the right ambition for all
persons. But if we look at an NCAA student-athlete, we might
wonder why, of the sixty-five teams that participated in the last
March madness tournament, forty-two of them failed to graduate even
half of their players. Or why the average Division I athlete spends
between forty and fifty hours a week lifting weights, traveling,
attending team meetings, playing games, and practicing, whereas
most other college students can work, at most, twenty hours a week.
Why is there such a discrepancy? Why are student-athletes treated so
differently than students?
Moreover, why is it that when a college athlete gets in trouble with
the law, he is often treated with kid gloves-yet, when his classmate
gets in trouble for the same infraction, there is often a severe sanc-
tion? What kind of message is transmitted when college players con-
sistently get in trouble and the coach looks the other way? That sends
the wrong message, to all who see it.
You also described NBA basketball as being unacceptably injuri-
ous to young athletes. Let us look at that idea, and first consider that,
over the last eleven years, we have seen forty-seven high school play-
ers attempt to jump to the NBA-and, remarkably, forty-two of them
are or were on NBA rosters. Not only have these forty-two players
out-performed the average NBA player, but there is simply no evi-
dence that they have suffered more injuries than the average NBA
player, or that they have suffered more injuries than if they had
played in college instead. I understand that there is a certain appeal to
that intuition, because we tend to be more protective of young persons
than other persons, but it is an intuition belied by the facts.
And again, I agree with your aspiration, but if we look at the reali-
ties of the college experience for premiere student-athletes, the data
suggests a vastly different environment than the one you describe.
MR. MILSTEIN: That is a good point. Sports people are treated
differently. Lebron is a perfect example of a lot of things, because
Lebron was someone who, at an early age, everyone knew was going
to become an NBA star. Now, if he was in eighth grade and he was a
superb violinist, his parents could find him a special tutor who would
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do nothing but train him in the violin. But you cannot do that for
young basketball players. If someone goes out and hires a profes-
sional trainer for the eighth grader, he will lose his eligibility. Why?
What makes the athlete different?
AUDIENCE: But they are doing that.
MR. MILSTEIN: Yeah, but they are doing it in a system in which
they are meant to feel like criminals.
AUDIENCE: Everyone is doing it. Look at soccer. Soccer has
more scenarios in which they have people personally train through
their coaching than any sport that I have seen in Ohio.
I coach at the Division III level at Oberlin College. I am seeing the
competition. Everyone is doing things, but they are learning how to
work within the laws. Some people want to pay $275 a day for three
or four days or a week. Ohio State has five weeks of camp. There are
all types of special training programs available. Some people are
charging twenty dollars to give an hour session. And there are all
sorts of deals that are set up for kids to come in and get the things that
are going to make them great and enhance their performance.
MR. CARFAGNA: The bigger, faster, stronger camps. That is
what we are talking about. It starts in the fifth, sixth, seventh grade.
AUDIENCE: I mean little kids. I talked with personal trainers in
California and there are some people paying money for that. I do not
know many kids who play football that are not on some type of per-
formance enhancement. All of them take some kind of performance
enhancement. The milkshakes, they all have them, and they do not
cost much. We are talking thirty dollars a month. Cell phones are
forty-five dollars a month.
MR. McCANN: But suppose athletes have to play four years of
college before they can turn pro. Would they not still have similar
incentives to improve their talent and body-shape in pursuing the best
available college scholarships? Athletes may think, I want to play at
Notre Dame or I want to play at USC, so I need to bulk up, and attract
the interest of their coaches. In other words, an age floor in the NBA
or NFL would not necessarily eliminate motivations to enhance body
shape through objectionable means.
AUDIENCE: If you go to Purdue, if you go to Ohio State, you do
not really have time for your education, unless you are just a special
person. That is true. I understand that. My son is an athlete. He has
been at Purdue, and is at Youngstown State right now. Politics has
played a lot into that, but as a parent and a coach, and working at the
Division III level, we still have to teach people the right way. And I
have to tell him that he still has to get his education. Kevin O'Donnell
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[Performance Consultant and Co-Founder of Speed Dynamics] will
probably say the Europeans expect maturity at middle age. Some
European runners and sprinters have done better after being properly
trained at older ages. In America, we take a younger person and tell
them that they are mature, that they are ready to go.
MR. McCANN: I actually studied arrest propensity among NBA
players and controlled for age and level of education among arrested
players. I found a near inverse relationship between number of years
spent in college and propensity to be arrested-in other words, an
entirely counterintuitive conclusion. I suspect that finding relates to
the environment and situation of college basketball and the kinds of
messages college basketball players hear and observe.
Just think about the recent arrest of Tony Allen of the Boston Cel-
tics. He is alleged to have ordered a friend to shoot a restaurant pa-
tron. One might wonder about what happened to Tony Allen while he
was in college. And if you look at his college record, you see that he
played for three schools. And you see that he repeatedly got into trou-
ble, and yet there was never any real sanction. And you see this pat-
tern again and again and again in college basketball and you begin to
wonder: What kind of environment do college basketball players ex-
perience? What kind of mentors do they have? Would they be better
off in the pros where they have a thirty-year old mentor helping them
instead of a twenty-one old mentor who can break rules and get away
with it?
Legal Challenge to New NBA Age Eligibility Rule
MR. CARFAGNA: The next question pertains to the recently
changed NBA rule, which Mr. McCann is an expert on. Mike, would
a challenge to the new, current NBA eligibility rule be successful, in
light of Clarett, and would you take that case?
MR. McCANN: I would certainly look at it.
MR. MILSTEIN: I thought you would refer it to me?
MR. McCANN: Right, I would refer it to Alan and he would hire
me (Laughter).
MR. CARFAGNA: And Joe, could we restate the new rule?
MR. ROSEN: The new rule is that you have to be nineteen-years-
old and one year removed from high school. Actually Mike, that is a
question that I was going to pose as well. If you were going to take
that case, Alan or Mike, I assume you would probably stay away from
the Second Circuit?
MR. MILSTEIN: You would lose in the Second Circuit, but the
ideal place to file it would be in the Sixth Circuit.
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MR. McCANN: Remember, Clarett presented a hypothetical.
Clarett had to argue that if we change the rule then this is how the
NFL would operate-that is a conceptually hard argument for an
amateur player to make. But with the NBA, we have already seen
eleven years of data. We have seen that the average high school
player in the NBA averages more points, grabs more rebounds, and
dishes out more assists than does the average NBA player or the aver-
age player of any age group in the NBA. In other words, high school
players that have matriculated directly from high school to the NBA
have been the optimal group. And there is no way a court will over-
look that. We have actual evidence. We are not arguing a hypotheti-
cal; we are arguing a continuation of a system that has empirically
worked well.
MR. MILSTEIN: The Second Circuit would never look at it be-
cause you do not get to the antitrust issues at all unless you get past
the labor exemption. So, in the Second Circuit, unfortunately, a chal-
lenge to the NBA rule would lose on the labor exemption.
MR. McCANN: But what about other circuits?
MR. MILSTEIN: I think that case is winnable in the Sixth Circuit.
And, of course, the difference between the NBA and the NFL was
that there was no way a court could find that the NFL rule had been
collectively bargained. The Second Circuit did find that, but it was
just an impossible situation to even imagine a court would conclude
that this had been collectively bargained.
The NBA rule is in the collective bargaining agreement, so you are
going to have that additional hurdle. The only way to win is to first
argue that it is not wages, hours, or terms of employment. Second,
argue that it primarily affects those outside the bargaining unit. In-
deed, it is aimed at those outside of the bargaining unit.
But, again, look at the reason for these rules. One is to perpetuate
the NCAA system. The second reason and, I think, the NBA's reason,
is when they had Kwame Brown, who was the number one draft pick
in 2001, when they missed, it cost them a lot of money. They believe
that if they get another year in which they can look at these players,
that their scouts can then get more data and have a better feel for
whether this guy is a sure thing or not sure thing. When you under-
stand that reasoning, you can look back at a Kwame Brown, who
signed a lucrative NBA contract right out of high school. If he had
gone to college, if he had been forced to go to college and let us say
he did as poorly in college in basketball as he did in the NBA, then he
would not have been drafted. So he never would have had the oppor-
tunity to make the money he made out of high school. Let the NBA
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team, the Washington Wizards, assume the risk and the loss, not
Brown.
Ideally, our system is structured so that if the employer makes a
bad decision, it is his fault. It should not be on a Kwame Brown, who
excels in high school to the point that the NBA teams are willing to
pick him number one in the draft. If he does not work out, he still has
his money and there is nothing to keep him from going to college.
That is what is so laughable about this academic argument. Consider
the Olsen twins at NYU. They have made millions of dollars. There is
nothing to keep them from going to college with a lot of money in
their pocket. Why do you think that if you go early and get money
that somehow you are foreclosed from ever enjoying the wonders of
an academic environment? It is just ludicrous. There are some rich
people at Case Western, rich students. They have a lot of money in
their pocket and they sit in their class and they learn. You can learn
with a full wallet. I promise you that.
MR. ROSEN: I want to make one point concerning the NBA. The
reason the NBA is a little different is that the assumption is that with
this one-year change, everybody is going to go to college now for one
year. That is not exactly true. I guarantee you in the next year or two,
you will see, whether it is the Sonny Vaccaros of the world or some
startup enterprise, you will see some league or some touring company
come out. That company will take the O.J. Mayos and Lebron
James's of the world and pay them a certain amount of money, get
them a shoe contract, tour across Europe and the United States; there
will be some new basketball league out there that will take advantage
of this. So, I do not know what we are doing about the NBA, but the
NBA is not actually making these guys go to college.
The Matt Leinart Case, Money, and "Loyalty"
AUDIENCE: Rather than your example of the person coming in as
a freshman or a child prodigy, I am more concerned with the person
who avails himself of the system up to his junior year, and then con-
templates turning pro before his senior year. And say this player is a
key player on his team, and say his team can only compete for a
championship next year with him on it. Should he not consider the
interests of his university and those of his fellow students or players?
MR. CARFAGNA: Are you referring to the Matt Leinart case? He
decided to stay at USC and gave up sixty to sixty-five million dollars.
MR. MILSTEIN: So you think it should be an obligation on the
part of these kids who perhaps come from poor environments and
whose families have no money? They should stay an extra year in
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college so that their college team has a chance to win the
championship?
AUDIENCE: And benefiting the university that is backing the
player.
MR. McCANN: The financial benefits, certainly.
MR. MILSTEIN: For the university.
MR. CARFAGNA: It is what Leinart did, right?
MR. McCANN: And that was his choice. He made his decision
and had the opportunity to make a decision. What Maurice would ar-
gue is that you should be able to decide, look, I have a very limited
window of time in my life when I can earn money as a result of my
athletic talents and I can rectify, arguably, centuries of poverty in my
family and I do not want to risk that by staying another year in school
and blowing out my knee or not playing well, particularly when I
have an opportunity to go to the pros right now. Why should I take
that risk? Would you, particularly if you came from a poor family?
And the loyalty factor is a characteristic that some players may
value a lot, while others do not. Just like all of us, right? We all work
at jobs. All of us have different values and allegiances. All of us have
different opportunities to change jobs. Should we be legally fore-
closed from changing positions simply because of loyalty or because
of the expectation of others that we be loyal? We likely weigh loyalty
but, in the absence of an employment contract, we have the right to
change jobs or pursue other interests. And remember, a college player
is not under a contract because he is not earning anything. He is just a
student who happens to play sports, or at least that is what he is sup-
posed to be-not a revenue generator for a college football program,
and not an entertainer for students, fans, alumni, and media.
MR. MILSTEIN: Plus, Clarett did bring Ohio State a national
championship. He brought the school one national championship. He
ran down the field when Sean Taylor intercepted the ball, knocked the
ball out of Taylor's hands, got the ball back for Ohio State, and that
let them come back and win the championship. That should have been
enough.
Viability of Other Professional Leagues as Employers
AUDIENCE: What is preventing these players from going to in-
ternational basketball leagues or the Canadian Football League (CFL)
or the Arena Football League?
MR. MILSTEIN: Money. That was one of the arguments that the
NFL made: we are not a monopoly, because look at the CFL. Come
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on. An athlete makes $200,000 a year in the CFL and that is somehow
on a par with the NFL?
AUDIENCE: It is simply an avenue to get there, to the NFL. Much
like the international prospects have stopped coming to U.S. colleges
to play basketball.
MR. MILSTEIN: But why should you not be able to go right to the
NFL?
MR. McCANN: And why should you risk an injury? Look at it
this way: say you are at the top of your class here at the Case School
of Law, and you have offers from a number of Cleveland law firms
that would pay you in excess of $100,000 a year. What if there was a
rule that, before you can accept one of those positions, you first have
to go to Bulgaria to practice law for a year, during which time you
will be paid $800? You are still practicing law and you are still earn-
ing an income, right? How would you feel about that? And how
would you feel if you knew that you would likely be able to practice
law for only four or five years, which is about the average career
length of a professional football player and a professional basketball
player? Or that, like a football or basketball player, you may suffer a
devastating injury any time you practice law? Spending one of those
years in Bulgaria making $800 now sounds even worse, does it not? It
is the proportionality of playing in the minors or abroad that strikes
many as completely unfair, particularly when you consider career
length and potential for injury. The NFL and NBA are incomparable.
MR. ROSEN: The problem is that the NFL is the only legitimate
football league in the world. The argument is a little different with the
NBA because you have the overseas leagues. You are still making a
lot less money overseas, though; even the best players are making a
lot less money overseas than they are in the NBA.
The reason is money. As I mentioned earlier, these leagues or trav-
eling teams pop up because at this point that is the only avenue they
have. They cannot play in the NBA when they are eighteen, so they
have to play in Bulgaria. Bulgaria is a bad example, because they do
not pay that much, unlike Spain or Italy. So they might go over there
and play.
MR. McCANN: But are we helping the person by forcing him to
do that? We have an eighteen-year-old, whose family would probably
prefer that he stay in the United States, and now he has to go to an-
other country, where he probably does not know anyone and may not
speak the language. I do not see how that is in his best interests or in
the best interests of his family. I certainly see how professional
leagues would like to see them develop without being paid NBA sala-
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ries, just like what happens when they develop by playing college
basketball, but I do not see how he is better off by being shipped
overseas.
Necessity of Age Eligibility "System "for NBA and NFL
AUDIENCE: I think it is obvious the panel does not like the status
quo of the NFL. What system would you recommend? I know there is
the perception that part of this is to protect, not necessarily Lebron
James or Maurice Clarett, but those kids who think that they have the
talent but do not get drafted and then do not have an education to fall
back on. Or, as you said, those kids who are a product of maturity and
they get into a professional game, at whatever age they might be,
when they are mature and then become a train wreck, like a Jennifer
Capriati. What system would you implement to try and protect that
group of players?
MR. MILSTEIN: We do not have to develop a separate system.
You do not need a system that is going to help the kid who comes out
of high school or first or second year of college that you do not need
for the kid that goes through four years. Whatever you think happens,
or potentially happens, is no more likely to happen to the high school
kid who jumps to the NBA than it is for the guy who spends three
years in college. The statistics just do not bear that out. Mike has done
that research. The high school athlete to the NBA is more successful,
by and large, than the athlete who is gone through two, three, or four
years of college.
MR. McCANN: Take a look at Latrell Sprewell. He choked his
coach at age twenty-eight and he played four years of college basket-
ball. Ron Artest played two years of college basketball and Ruben
Patterson played four years of college basketball.
AUDIENCE: There will always be thugs. It does not matter if they
have four years of college or one day of college, or whatever, there
are people who have gone through college, gone through good pro-
grams like Michigan, and then they rob banks because they could not
make it in professional sports. They have a problem, whether they
lived in the inner city or a suburban environment. Some people have a
criminal aspect to their character and it does not matter how much or
how little education they have; if they cannot make it one way they
will try to do it illegally another way.
Deference to Collective Bargaining and Clarett 's Choice
AUDIENCE: I have one general and one specific question. Gener-
ally, given that the players in the NFL have voted to be represented
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exclusively by a union and given that the union spends their days and
nights thinking about what is best for players, do you think that the
union and the group representing the management are well situated to
determine whether there ought to be an age eligibility rule? Specifi-
cally, do you think Clarett would have been better off coming into the
NFL the year before he did and, if so, what happened?
MR. MILSTEIN: There is no question about that, if he had not lost
in the Second Circuit and gone the year before.
AUDIENCE: Well, what was it about the year out that undid him,
because he said he was in better shape and he felt like he was more
mature and he crashed and burned this year.
MR. MILSTEIN: He did crash and burn.
MR. McCANN: He also went through the combine and did not
perform well. That is what it came down to.
MR. MILSTEIN: I think, if he had been drafted that first year, my
personal view is, he would have been a star. I still think Maurice is a
tremendous talent and has a chance to make it in the NFL. And I hope
he does.
As for your other question, of course the labor organization and
the league can decide the age eligibility rule. But the labor exemption
does not make it exempt from antitrust law. It is an antitrust violation.
Suppose the labor organization decided that they did not want
anybody to endorse Nike products. They cannot do that. They are a
labor organization. They have got the league. They probably have a
pretty good reason for deciding that but they are not allowed to. The
antitrust laws are supposed to be a fairly strong measure to promote
competition.
AUDIENCE: But there is interplay between the two bodies of law;
do you just disagree that this ought to be recognized as something that
is covered by a labor exemption?
MR. MILSTE1N: Age eligibility should not be covered by the la-
bor exemption because it primarily affects workers outside of the bar-
gaining unit. It is an exemption to the antitrust laws and is supposed
to be narrowly construed.
AUDIENCE: In the example of the NBA, you talked about
Kwame Brown and how the draft did not work. Is it not in the play-
ers' and management's interest for their draft to work as well as it
can? It is designed to have the poorer teams draft higher. So the play-
ers' union and management must believe that a higher age eligibility
rule will make for a better draft. And the NBA does not want poor
teams making mistakes because that would be bad for the league and
the players. Do you think that the people who spend the most time
[Vol. 56:3
2006] LEGALITY OF A GE RESTRICTIONS IN THE NBA AND NFL 763
dealing with the players' and management's interest ought to be able
to make this kind of rule?
MR. MILSTEIN: They should not be able to make a rule that sti-
fles competition even if they think it is in their best interest to do so.
AUDIENCE: How about a minimum salary? If you are in a league
for four years, you have to make four hundred thousand dollars. There
are probably players that have been in the league for a number of
years.
MR. MILSTEIN: They can do that. That only affects players in the
league. It affects wages and is bargained for. So it meets that narrow
exemption.
AUDIENCE: It does keep some players out of the league, because
a team may not think you are worth four hundred-thousand but we
cannot hire you for less than that.
MR. MILSTEIN: But it fits the three criteria. It is not the same as
keeping somebody out of the league.
MR. ROSEN: There is no group boycott against any particular
group of individuals with a minimum salary rule, because it is a rule
designed to govern the entire league. In contrast, an age eligibility
rule or an age floor prohibits an entire group from eligibility.
MR. MILSTEIN: And just suppose Clarett entered the league be-
fore the Second Circuit reversed, and the NFL and the union were
upset about it. And they decide that they need to prevent schools like
Ohio State from alienating players like Maurice. So, for the next five
years they say that teams cannot draft players from Ohio State, be-
cause that is what is best for our league. It is good for the league. It is
bargained for. Can they do it? You obviously think they can.
AUDIENCE: I doubt that the union would agree to that.
MR. MILSTEIN: But suppose they did. Can they do it?
AUDIENCE: I would suppose they could.
Prospect of Congressionally Mandated Age Floor
MR. CARFAGNA: You know we have an expert, a good friend of
mine, who has been a Teamsters lawyer for many, many years, Gary
Boncella, it would be interesting to get his input. I just asked him if
he would be kind enough to share his thoughts with us.
MR. GARY BONCELLA: The government legislates and protects
people of minor age whether it is protecting dangerous machinery, not
being able to drive a truck, or not getting a commercial vehicle li-
cense in a nonworking area. They are protected from pornography
and they are unable to make medical decisions. You are arguing that
there are going to be subjective judgments. If somebody is able to go
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into the NBA or NFL, they should be able to, by whatever criteria the
organization uses.
We have apprentice programs in the various trades that set
minimum requirements. What if Senator McCain, who is seeking to
enforce the banning of steroids in Major League Baseball, says there
are sixteen-year-olds who want to play basketball, and we think that
is too young. Let us have hearings. Let us set the minimum age at
eighteen or nineteen to play dangerous sports. That would put it on
par with other trades, other crafts, not as glamorous as football and
baseball and basketball, but would that be something that you would
accept?
Second, why can you not have a program, as the building trades
do, that set minimum age requirements to learn how to be a mason, a
carpenter, or a sheet-metalworker and have that as accepted collective
bargaining agreement? That is accepted in collective bargaining and it
is not challenged.
MR. McCANN: First of all, I would find it ironic if Congress were
to say that you have to be nineteen-years-old to play a dangerous
sport and yet you can be eighteen-years-old and sent off to war. There
is a glaring hypocrisy to that.
MR. BONCELLA: Pick an age. Congress sets the age. Your ar-
gument is that the age does not matter, so if a person at age fifteen has
the ability of a Lebron James to play basketball, he should be able to
do it without regulation from anyone.
MR. McCANN: I would argue that age is a proxy. I would not say
it is irrelevant, and some teams clearly value it more than others.
MR. BONCELLA: But I am saying, if Congress then said, through
its legislative power and ability to regulate interstate commerce, that
eighteen is the minimum age.
MR. MILSTEIN: Well, here is the difference, as Mr. Rosen says.
If Congress establishes that as a rule, then that is the rule. What hap-
pens in the NFL is that a group of teams have combined to keep indi-
vidual teams from hiring these players who are otherwise eligible. So
you have an antitrust violation. You have a conspiracy. You have an
agreement. You do not have that in the congressional setting. If you
had a congressional hearing that said you had to be eighteen to play in
a dangerous sport, and if they listed the sports in the NFL and the
NHL, Congress could do that. There would be hearings on it and it
may or may not pass.
MR. ROSEN: There might be an age discrimination suit.
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MR. BONCELLA: What about the apprentice program, in which
you have to be eighteen to get into the apprentice program for sheet-
metal working or carpentry? Why is that not the same?
MR. MILSTEIN: Again, the difference is what Congress does.
MR. BONCELLA: Take it out of the congressional situation. In-
stead, the carpenter's union and the employer's association have a
collective bargaining agreement that allows for an apprentice program
that sets a minimum age of eighteen. Why is that different from what
the NFL and the NBA have done with their players?
MR. MILSTEIN: I assume the apprentice program is designed to
make sure that those who come to the labor are adequately trained.
That is not the purpose of the age restriction in the NBA or the NFL.
Lebron is the perfect example for all of this. He is the best guy in the
NBA and he was when he walked in. He is eighteen. How in the
world should Lebron have been forced to go through three or four
years of college? Is there any question that if Lebron was on the Ohio
State basketball team that it would be beneficial to Ohio State or that
it would be beneficial to the NCAA? It might even be beneficial to
the NBA, because you would have a much stronger NCAA. But it is
unfair to Lebron. He is capable; he is physically able to be in the
league. In fact, he is one of the best players in the league.
MR. BONCELLA: So you do not want any age restriction, and it
should be determined solely on a case-by-case basis, regardless of
good faith bargaining between the players' association and the
league?
MR. MILSTEIN: That is correct: I am opposed to any age
restriction. And the main difference is that no one is drafted unless he
is capable and ready to be in the league. No one makes the squad
unless he is good enough to be on the squad. No one gets a starting
position unless he is ready to start. And if he is ready, why should he
be prevented?
AUDIENCE: So you are arguing that maybe the NBA should have
let Lebron play at sixteen?
MR. MILSTEIN: I wanted that case. Lebron would have been the
number one pick in the draft after his junior year in high school.
There is no question about that. Why could he not play in the NBA.
What was preventing him from doing it? Because he would lose the
opportunity to go through twelfth grade? Is that your argument? Be-
lieve me, you can go though twelfth grade with two million dollars in
your pocket. You can do that.
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Paternalism
MR. CARFAGNA: How much of this is paternalistic thinking?
There are rules that prohibit drinking, for example, until a certain age.
Do you not think the NCAA, the NBA, and the NFL are protecting
these young egotistical kids from being in situations they are not
ready for: the fame, money, jobs, etc. And is that not a fair and proper
thing? The labor pool knows itself better than anybody else. We think
that is best for the kids.
MR. McCANN: If the labor pool knew itself better than everyone
else, then it would not argue for that, because we have seen a near
inverse correlation between how many years you spend in college and
propensity to be arrested in the NBA.
As to the comment on drinking, remember that rules that tie age to
drinking are premised on public safety. And there is a qualitative dif-
ference between worrying about whether someone is going to drink
and drive and whether that person is going to cash a paycheck and
dribble a basketball. And remember that policies promoting public
safety are far different than those for regulating behavior, particularly
when the latter appear animated by a desire to preserve jobs for fringe
NBA veterans and a desire to enable the NCAA and NBA to profit
from unpaid college basketball players.
MR. MILSTEIN: That was the NFL's major argument. We are do-
ing this for Clarett. Our age eligibility rule is for him. Does anybody
really believe that-that the purpose of the eligibility rules is to pro-
tect these kids? They are all about money and power. That is it.
Economic Value of College Education for Professional Players
AUDIENCE: How much money did Matt Leinart's agent lose
when Leinart chose not to sign the sixty-five million dollar contract
that he would have signed for being the first pick in the 2005 NFL
draft? How much money does the agent for Leinart lose as a result?
MR. ROSEN: With someone like Leinart, 2 percent or maybe even
less.
AUDIENCE: But the fact is, the statistics show that a football
player with a college degree will earn significantly more than a foot-
ball player without a college degree. So maybe it is just deferred in
terms of what the agent has lost.
MR. ROSEN: I find the deferral very interesting, especially as I
represent baseball players. Age eligibility works differently in base-
ball than in the NFL and NBA. An amateur baseball player may enter
the MLB draft straight out of high school, but if he declines that op-
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portunity, or if he does not sign a professional contract after being
drafted, certain restrictions arise. For instance, if he attends a four-
year school then he would have to have to attend for at least three
years or until he is twenty-one-years-old. For every contract that I
have negotiated, I make sure that part of that contract provides for the
client's education at the end of his baseball career. It does not gener-
ally work that way in basketball and football, but, as Alan and Mike
said, you are free to go back to school whenever you want.
And in baseball contracts, teams are very, very willing to give
those scholarships. Why do you think that is the case? It is because
players seldom use them. And I make sure I negotiate that in. And
baseball teams are willing to give that up because they argue that the
scholarship money should come off the signing bonus. That is an ar-
gument we have very often, but it works a little differently in that
situation. But the end result is that you are always free to go back to
school. Deferring education now does not mean that you are getting
rid of it entirely.
AUDIENCE: No, but it might, because they are giving up eligibil-
ity, and then they have to pay for it. And given the socioeconomics of
the athlete, they would be far less likely to go back and pay for their
own college education.
MR. ROSEN: That is true, but remember that, for instance, the
NBA employs a rookie scale. Every new contract a player signs in the
NBA is at least two years guaranteed with two team options. They are
not making five bucks an hour. They are making millions and mil-
lions of dollars. So they are going to be able to pay for it, if they want
to. The NFL is a little different because there are no guaranteed con-
tracts, but in the NBA there generally are. If these players want to go
back to school, then they can go back to school. That is the end result
and by deferring it, I do not think you are getting around that.
Closing Arguments
MR. MILSTEIN: This is an issue that has to get to the United
States Supreme Court. There is a clear conflict in the circuits, be-
tween the Sixth Circuit and the Second Circuit. I am as convinced
about this issue as I have been about any issue that I have ever liti-
gated: the eligibility rule of the NFL violates the antitrust laws.
MR. McCANN: If you look at all of the data, all of the available
information, all of the past precedent, and all of the economic and
sociopsychological applications, one thing is remarkably clear: it does
not make sense to ban players out of high school from going to the
NBA. There is a good chance the same is true of players seeking the
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NFL. And the bottom line is that these rules are based on perpetuating
a system in which there is a free minor league system for the pros to
develop players.
